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Abstract: This paper explores the narratives of the attack 
on the Bethel church (GBI/Gereja Bethel Indonesia) in 
Penauyong Aceh on June 17, 2012, provided for by the 
victims. Among these are those who hold fear of Christian 
missionaries, including one of the likely perpetrators, and 
those who dismissed these as mere rumors. After relating 
the incident to other violence across the nation during the 
reform period and to the local Aceh context, the paper 
delved into the interviews undertaken on July 2013, from 
which the sources of narratives were taken, explaining 
motivations behind the mob, trauma resulting from it, and 
other factors contributing to the incident. Through this 
article I argue that the sharia implementation  raise the new 
identity formulation of Islamic Acehnese, through which 
the dividing line between ‘Muslims’ and others ‘non-
Muslims’ is further stressed. This in turn nurtures, among 
other things, the sentiments among the Acehnese against 
the non-Muslims.   
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Introduction: Violence at the National Level 
In the aftermath of Suharto’s fall, the crisis during the reformation 
era, marked with the euphoria of freedom of expression in the new 
wave of democratization, witnessed various forms of violence in the 
name of religion, one of which was attacks on minorities.2 Ahmadiyah, 
Shi’ite, Sufi, Christian churches, and other new religious groups 
branded deviant by the MUI (Indonesian Ulama Council) were 
vulnerable to intimidations and attacks by radical groups or mobs3. On 
the other hand, through mass rallies on the streets, groups, such as the 
FPI (Defenders front of Islam), HTI (Indonesian Party of Liberation), 
MMI (Jihadi Council of Indonesia), FUI (Islamic Forum Community), 
FAPB (Front for Anti-apostasy in Bekasi), put pressure on the 
government and society to implement policies in line with their radical 
ideologies, such as religious intolerance.4 In short, the free atmosphere 
in the more democratic country gave the radicals an opportunity to 
propagate their ideology.  
Along with the bolder move of radicals and conservatives in the 
public domain5 (Hefner 2008), the more muscular Islamic orthodoxy 
under the guardianship of the MUI has somehow contributed to the 
government’s indifferent attitude, especially under Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono’s administration, towards discriminations against 
minorities. As a result, leaders of many minority groups, such as Lia 
                                                                
2 Julia Day Howell, “Pluralist Currents and Counter-Currents in the Indonesian Mass 
Media,” in Religious Pluralism, State and Society in Asia, ed. Chiara Formici (London: 
Routledge, 2014), 216–35; Mark Woodward, Java, Indonesia and Islam (Dordrecht, 
Holland; Cinnaminson [N.J.], U.S.A.: Springer, 2011), 225; Myengkyo Seo, State 
Management of Religion in Indonesia (London: Routledge, 2013), 1–2; Robert W. Hefner, 
“A Conservative Turn in Indonesian Islam? Genesis and Future.,” in Muslim Politics and 
Democratization in Indonesia, Annual Indonesia Lecture Series 28 (Clayton, Vic.; 
Melbourne, Vic.: Monash Asia Institute, 2008), 33–50. 
3 Ahmad Suaedy et al., Islam, the Constitution and Human Rights, the Problematics of Religious 
Freedom in Indonesia (Jakarta: Wahid Institute, 2010), 131–208; Ahmad Suaedy, 
“Religious Freedom and Violence in Indonesia,” in Islam in Contention: Rethinking Islam 
and State in Indonesia, ed. Ota Atsushi and Okamoto Masaaki (Jakarta: Wahid Institute, 
2010), 139–69; Al Makin, “Persecuting, Prosecuting Minorities,” The Jakarta Post, 
September 3, 2012. 
4 Ismail Hasani and Bonar Tigor Naipospos, Dari Radikalisme Menuju Terorisme, Studi 
Relasi Dan Transformasi Organisasi Islam Radical Di Jawa Tengah Dan D.I. Yogyakarta 
(Jakarta: Pustaka Media, 2012). 
5 Hefner, “A Conservative Turn in Indonesian Islam? Genesis and Future.” 
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Eden of the Eden group based in Jakarta and Yusman Roy of the 
Itikaf Lelaku based in Malang, whom the radicals attacked, were trialed 
in the courts and jailed6 (Makin, 2011; Makin, forthcoming). They were 
accused of committing blasphemy law 1965, over which some 
moderate and liberal Muslim intellectuals failed to propose a judicial 
review to the Constitutional Court (MK) in 2010.7 Minorities—
including Islamic minority groups (such as the Shi’ite, Ahmadiyah) and 
non-Islamic groups (such as Christian churches or apostates from 
Islam)—have no legal protection before the law and were easily 
persecuted and prosecuted.  
On the other hand, since the New Order period, the relationship 
between Muslims and Christians can be described as suspicious 
towards each other, due to the ‘politicization’ of religion during 
Soeharto’s regime.8 In fact, the Christians as minority feared 
‘Islamization’ and any efforts of the majority Muslims to pursue the 
establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. On the other hand, 
Muslims also often suspected that the Christians still perform 
missionary activities, such as in evangelization efforts to convert 
Muslims into Christians.9 With this, Muslims often protested the 
building of many new churches in the places in which only a few 
Christian resided. Worse still, the reform period also witnessed the 
fierce bloody conflict between the believers of the two Abrahamic 
                                                                
6 Al Makin, “Pluralism versus Islamic Orthodoxy, the Indonesian Public Debate over 
the Case of Lia Aminuddin, the Founder of Salamullah Religious Cult,” Journal of the 
International Yale Indonesia Forum, 2011; Al Makin, Challenging Islamic Orthodoxy, the 
Accounts of Lia Eden and Other Prophets in Indonesia (Dordrecht, Holland; Cinnaminson 
[N.J.], U.S.A.: Springer, forthcoming). 
7 Margiyono et al., “Bukan Jalan Tengah” Eksaminasi Publik Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi 
Perhal Pengujian Undang-Undang Nomor 1 PNPS Tahun 1965 Tentang Penyalahgunaan 
Dan/atau Penodaan Agama (Jakarta: ILRC, 2010), 25–43. 
8 Michel Picard, “Introduction, Agama, Adat, and Pancasila,” in The Politics of Religion in 
Indonesia, Syncretism, Orthodoxy, and Religious Contention in Java and Bali, ed. Michel Picard 
and Madinier (London: Routledge, 2011), 1–20; Rahmat Subagya, Kepercayaan, Kebatinan 
Kerohanian Kejiwaan Dan Agama (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Yayasan Kanisius, 1980); Djoko 
Dwiyanto, Penghayat Kepercayaan Terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa. (Yogyakarta: Pararaton, 
2010); Seo, State Management of Religion in Indonesia. 
9 Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened : Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia’s New Order 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006); Chang-Yau Hoon, “Between 
Evangelism and Multiculturalism: The Dynamics of Protestant Christianity in 
Indonesia,” Social Compass 60, no. 4 (2013): 457–70. 
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religions in Ambon. Although the reconciliation between the two 
warring factions can be described as successful,10 the trauma resulted 
from the conflict does not fade away easily. In this vein, many radical 
groups often recalled the conflict as a justification of their intolerant 
actions. 
It is also noteworthy that during the New Order era, there was a 
gap between intellectual endeavors made by some elite Muslim and 
Christian intellectuals, and NGO activists, to hold religious dialogues 
between different faiths and the government’s policy which does not 
support religious freedom and equity. On the one hand, Muslim and 
Christian intellectuals in Yogyakarta, Jakarta, and Salatiga promoted the 
values of pluralism and inter-religious dialogues through seminar 
forums, books, and NGO’s activities.11 On the other hand, the 
government issued policy which still displayed intolerance and 
inequality in a society of religious plurality.  
An illustration of the government’s policy which still hampers the 
freedom of faith is the difficulty of the procedure required to build a 
house of worship. According to the Joint Regulation no. 8 and 9 of 
2006, any religious community who want to establish a house of 
worship must collect at least 90 signatures of the congregation’s 
members and those of 60 residents embracing another religion. 
Furthermore, the community must obtain a recommendation from the 
local office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and of the local 
government. Based on the regulation, it is hard for a small community 
lacking the numbers to fulfill the conditions necessary to have a place 
of worship. Due to this, many Christian communities in Yogyakarta, 
                                                                
10 Sumanto Al Qurtuby, “Peace-Building in Indonesia: Christian–Muslim Alliances in 
Ambon Island,” Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 24, no. 3 (2014): 349–67. 
11 Greg Barton, “Indonesia’s Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as 
Intellectual Ulama: The Meeting of Islamic Traditionalism and Modernism in Neo‐
modernist Thought,” Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 8, no. 3 (1997): 323–50; 
Mujiburrahman, “The Diaspora Church in Indonesia: Mangunwijaya on Nationalism, 
Humanism, and Catholic Praxis,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 38, no. 4 (2001): 444–57; 
Ann. Kull, Piety and Politics: Nurcholish Madjid and His Interpretation of Islam in Modern 
Indonesia (Lund: Department of History and Anthropology of Religions Lund 
University, 2005); Makin, “Pluralism versus Islamic Orthodoxy, the Indonesian Public 
Debate over the Case of Lia Aminuddin, the Founder of Salamullah Religious Cult”; 
Al Makin, “Pluralism in Education, a Study of Mukti Ali’s Thought,” Journal of the 
International Yale Indonesia Forum, 2012; Hoon, “Between Evangelism and 
Multiculturalism: The Dynamics of Protestant Christianity in Indonesia”; Seo, State 
Management of Religion in Indonesia. 
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Jakarta, and West Java, used hotels, houses, and other places for their 
religious sermons. On the other hand, the number of mosques has 
recently increased significantly throughout islands in the country. In 
fact, Muslims do not need any permission from any authority to build 
mosques in many cities with Muslim majority populations. Ironically, 
radical groups often spread rumors among neighborhoods pointing to 
many places of worship without legal status or the government’s 
permission, which they can ambush anytime (will also be shown by the 
Acehnese informants below). This also spread additional fears among 
minorities.12 Ichwan describes this situation as perpetuating the old 
‘majority Muslims’ fear’ to the minority Christians. 
During the reform era, news about radicals mobs, attacking, 
destroying, or intimidating some churches belonging to minority 
Christians often appeared in the headlines of the media. Crouch13 
remarks on the destruction of churches during the reform period as 
follows: Habibie’s government (1998–99) witnessed 156 churches 
destroyed; Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001) 232 churches; under 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–09) more than 100 churches were 
attacked or closed down by force of either mob or local governments. 
This can be seen as a national scenario, according to which much local 
violence shared similar stories and patterns14: radicals ambushed 
minorities without government’s intervention to protect the victims, 
who were then often criminalized in the court trials. The attack on the 
Bethel church15 in Aceh, on which this paper is focused on, seems to 
                                                                
12 Moch. Nur Ichwan, “Official Ulema and the Politics of Re-Islamization: The Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Ulama, Shariatization and Contested Authority in Post-New Order 
Aceh,” Journal of Islamic Studies 22, no. 2 (2011): 206; Melissa Crouch, “Implementing 
the Regulation on Places of Worship in Indonesia: New Problems, Local Politics and 
Court Action.,” Asian Studies Review 34, no. 4 (2010): 409; Hoon, “Between Evangelism 
and Multiculturalism: The Dynamics of Protestant Christianity in Indonesia,” 462; Seo, 
State Management of Religion in Indonesia, 71–72. 
13 Crouch, “Implementing the Regulation on Places of Worship in Indonesia: New 
Problems, Local Politics and Court Action.,” 406; Seo, State Management of Religion in 
Indonesia, 36. 
14 Jemma Purdey, “Describing Kekerasan: Some Observations on Writing about 
Violence in Indonesia after the NewOrder,” Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- En 
Volkenkunde 160, no. 2/3 (2004): 210. 
14 Greg Barton, “Indonesia’s Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as 
Intellectual Ulama: The Meeting of Islamic Traditionalism and Modernism in Neo‐
modernist Thought,” Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 8, no. 3 (1997): 323–50; 
Mujiburrahman, “The Diaspora Church in Indonesia: Mangunwijaya on Nationalism, 
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fall into this national scenario. However, this paper further pays 
attention to the ways in which local scenarios and narratives 
developed. Keep in mind that each attack of the places of worships has 
its own narrative, agency, supporters, and victims16 (Purdey 2004, p. 
200). Thus local context, in which the attacks took place, should be 
further explained.   
Local Aceh Context  
From the colonial to reform era, for the Acehnese, Islam has 
always been part of their identity.17 In the eyes of most of Aceh 
Muslims, adat (custom) and sharia (Islamic law) have mingled, or 
become united—a belief justified by historical interpretation and 
                                                                                                                                      
Humanism, and Catholic Praxis,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 38, no. 4 (2001): 444–57; 
Ann. Kull, Piety and Politics: Nurcholish Madjid and His Interpretation of Islam in Modern 
Indonesia (Lund: Department of History and Anthropology of Religions Lund 
University, 2005); Makin, “Pluralism versus Islamic Orthodoxy, the Indonesian Public 
Debate over the Case of Lia Aminuddin, the Founder of Salamullah Religious Cult”; 
Al Makin, “Pluralism in Education, a Study of Mukti Ali’s Thought,” Journal of the 
International Yale Indonesia Forum, 2012; Fatimah Husein, Muslim-Christian Relations in the 
New Order Indonesia: The Exclusivist and Inclusivist Muslims’ Perspectives. (Bandung: Mizan, 
2005); Hoon, “Between Evangelism and Multiculturalism: The Dynamics of Protestant 
Christianity in Indonesia”; Seo, State Management of Religion in Indonesia. 
15 The Bethel church (GBI/Gereja Bethel Indonesia) is the largest Christian Pentecostal 
church in Indonesia and is under the PGI (Persatuan Gereja Indonesia/Indonesian 
Communion Church) administration. The Bethel church was founded in Tennessee, 
US in 1970. In Indonesia the GBI was initiated by priest Senduk and his friends from 
the Full Gospel Bethel Church (GBIS), a splinter of the GPdI (Pentecostal Church in 
Indonesia). In 2008 the GBI has about 2000 churches with 2.2 million believers. The 
church is officially acknowledged by the Ministry of Religious Affairs of Indonesia 
with the letter no. 41 on December 9, 1972. Many mega Bethel churches have been 
built in big cities, such as Jakarta, Bandung, and Medan, which attract many middle 
class believers. See their websites: http://www.gbi-bethel.org/ (accessed on September 
5, 2014); http://sinodegbi.net/ (accessed on September 5, 2014); https://www.-
facebook.com/gerejabethelindonesia (accessed on September 5, 2014); http://www.-
gbitanjungduren.com/ (accessed on September 5, 2014) (See also Seo 2013, pp. 30, 37, 
39, 41, 106-107; Hoon 2013).  
16 Purdey, “Describing Kekerasan: Some Observations on Writing about Violence in 
Indonesia after the NewOrder,” 200. 
17 Hasnil Basri Siregar, “Lessons Learned from the Implementation of Islamic Shari’ 
Ah Criminal Law in Aceh,” Journal of Law and Religion 24, no. 1 (2009 2008): 143; 
Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad, “The Application of Islamic Law in Indonesia: 
The Case Study of Aceh,” Journal of Indonesian Islam 1, no. 1 (2007): 135–80. 
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political ideology.18 Interestingly, the sharia is also a bargaining tool 
used by the central government to tame the rebellious movement for 
the Aceh’s independence. To begin with, during the early period of 
Indonesian revolution, Daud Beureueh, a charismatic rebel leader 
against Jakarta, demanded from Sukarno the granting of a special 
status for the province Aceh with the implementation of Sharia on the 
region. However, both the first president and his successor Soeharto, 
upholding the secular ideology of the nation of Indonesia, failed to 
meet these demand. On the other hand, the Free Aceh Movement 
(GAM), founded by Hasan Tiro in 1970s, was secular in nature. Salim, 
for instance, underscores that Tiro saw shari’a as an obstacle to achieve 
their goal of the Aceh’s independence.19 However, in the aftermath of 
the tsunami disaster the promise of a rigorous implementation of 
sharia in the province was offered during the Helsinki peace 
negotiation in 2005, serving as an effective political strategy for the 
central government to end the war between the central government 
and the GAM.20. Feener21, on the other hand, argues that the sharia is 
not only a top-down project deriving from the central government’s 
political motivation and strategy but he also draws our attention to the 
fact that many local politicians also welcome the project. It appears 
that the picture of sharia’s acceptance among the Acehnese is more 
complex than either ‘top-down’ or ’bottom-up’ project. The narratives 
in the following interviews will reveal the views of those who welcome, 
and those who are critical to, the implementation of sharia. 
                                                                
18 Arskal. Salim, “‘Shari‘a from Below’ in Aceh (1930s–1960s): Islamic Identity and the 
Right to Self-Determination with Comparative Reference to the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF),” Indonesia and the Malay World 32, no. 92 (2004): 83; Edward 
Aspinall, “The Construction of Grievance: Natural Resources and Identity in a 
Separatist Conflict,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 6 (2007): 958. 
19 Salim, “‘Shari‘a from Below’ in Aceh (1930s–1960s): Islamic Identity and the Right 
to Self-Determination with Comparative Reference to the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF),” 92; Ichwan, “Official Ulema and the Politics of Re-Islamization: The 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama, Shariatization and Contested Authority in Post-New 
Order Aceh,” 204. 
20 Ichwan, “Official Ulema and the Politics of Re-Islamization: The Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Ulama, Shariatization and Contested Authority in Post-New Order 
Aceh,” 198. 
21 Michael Feener, Sharia and Social Engineering, the Implementation of Islamic Law in 
Contemporary Aceh. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 19. 
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Moreover, I would like to argue that the status of special autonomy 
and the implementation of sharia in the post-Helsinki peace talks seem 
to further raise the Islamic identity in the Acehnese. The many 
testimonies highlighted below seem to confirm this. Apparently, the 
resurgence of a new identity articulation of being Acehnese and 
Muslim took in a rather novel way compared to the already existing 
root of Islamic identity justified by historical interpretation, stressing 
the belief that Aceh has been Islamized for a long time22. To begin 
with, it is important to note the difference between the identity 
expression of the Acehnese during the conflict and post-conflict. 
During the height of the conflict between the Indonesian government 
and the GAM, the dividing line between Acehnese and Indonesians, 
particularly the Javanese elites who, for the Acehnese, had drained the 
resources of the province without fair compensation for the local 
people, was highlighted.23 However, in the new identity formulation 
concomitant with the sharia24 implementation in the post-tsunami 
relief, the dividing line between we ‘Muslims’ and other ‘non-Muslims’ 
is stressed. It should also be borne in mind that after the tsunami 
disaster various non-Acehnese elements entered the territory from 
other provinces and abroad, for the purposes of relief programs, giving 
aids, and rebuilding the province after the devastation25. This perhaps 
also further catapulted their identity as unique Islamic Acehnese, 
marking the difference between the locals and guests, the victims and 
helpers, the indigenous and foreigners. 
                                                                
22 Aspinall, “The Construction of Grievance: Natural Resources and Identity in a 
Separatist Conflict,” 959; Yusny Saby, “The Ulama in Aceh: A Brief Historical 
Survey,” Studia Islamika, 2001, 1–54. 
23 Aspinall, “The Construction of Grievance: Natural Resources and Identity in a 
Separatist Conflict,” 964. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Arskal. Salim, “Dynamic Legal Pluralism in Indonesia: Contested Legal Orders in 
Contemporary Aceh,” Journal Of Legal Pluralism 10, no. 61 (2010): 20; Marcus Mietzner, 
“Local Elections and Autonomy in Papua and Aceh: Mitigating or Fueling 
Secessionism?,” Indonesia 84, no. October (2007): 22; Philippe Le Billon and Arno 
Waizenegger, “Peace in the Wake of Disaster? Secessionist Conflicts and the 2004 
Indian Ocean Tsunami,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 32, no. 3 (2007): 
402. 
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Along with the rise of Islamic orthodoxy at the national level of 
Indonesia during the reform era26, Feener also highlights the increasing 
orthodoxy in Aceh especially after the implementation of sharia in the 
post tsunami disaster27. Likewise, minority groups—Christian, sufi, or 
other groups branded deviant by the MPU—were vulnerable to mob 
attacks28. Moreover, in the wake of the tsunami, some radical and 
conservative groups—such as Laskar Jihad, KAMMI (an Islamic 
student association affiliated to the Justice and Prosperity Party/PKS), 
FPI, MMI, Laskar Jihad, and HTI29—also entered Aceh. On the other 
hand, the status of non-Muslims under the new implementation of 
sharia brings another dilemma, whether they, if committing sins or 
breaking Islamic law, can be punished under the sharia court30. 
Besides paying attention to the national level scenario mentioned 
above, we should also relate the attack on the Bethel church in Aceh to 
the issue of new identity formation of the Islamic Acehnese, whose 
fear is renewed in facing the presence of minority Christian groups, 
seen as both non-Muslims and outsiders. It should also be kept in 
mind that most Christians in Aceh, particular in the Bethel church, 
come from Medan, Java, and Menado.  
Whereas Crow31 calls our attention to the Acehnese as a minority 
ethnic group put in the broader Indonesian archipelago and as victims 
of violence, military repression, and abuses, this paper pays particular 
attention to the Christians in the province as victims of violence within 
                                                                
26 Clare Isobel Harvey, “Muslim Intellectualism in Indonesia: The Liberal Islam 
Network (JIL) Controversy,” Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs 43, no. 2 (2009): 
13–52; Mun’im Sirry, “Fatwas and Their Controversy: The Case of the Council of 
Indonesian Ulama (MUI),” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 44, no. 1 (2003): 100–117; 
Ichwan, “Official Ulema and the Politics of Re-Islamization: The Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Ulama, Shariatization and Contested Authority in Post-New Order 
Aceh.” 
27 Feener, Sharia and Social Engineering, the Implementation of Islamic Law in Contemporary 
Aceh., 19. 
28 Ibid., 125. 
29 Ichwan, “Official Ulema and the Politics of Re-Islamization: The Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Ulama, Shariatization and Contested Authority in Post-New Order 
Aceh,” 192–193. 
30 Salim, “Dynamic Legal Pluralism in Indonesia: Contested Legal Orders in 
Contemporary Aceh,” 25. 
31 Karim Crow, “Aceh - The ‘Special Territory’ in North Sumatra: A Self-Fulfilling 
Promise?,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 20, no. 1 (2000): 91–104. 
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the majority Muslims. Interestingly, the issue of minority-majority, 
particularly Islam-Christian, relations in the country was addressed in 
the first debate of the Indonesian parliament in 1967 with the case of 
the Meulaboh incident, a town in the Aceh province. The story goes 
that local Muslims staged a serious protest against the building of a 
Methodist Church in the town, seen as unacceptable for the majority 
Muslims population. In the parliamentary debate, two Christian parties: 
Parkindo (Indonesian Protestant Party) and Partai Katolik addressed 
the issue and related it to vulnerable religious freedom in the country32. 
Moreover, during the post-conflict period, the Aceh local government 
issued the regulation no. 25, 2007 with a stricter rule to any community 
wanting to build a house of worship than the 2006 regulation states. 
According to this local regulation, the community has to collect 150 
signatures of the members and those of 120 neighbors of a different 
faith33. Interestingly, the Aceh ulama consider is the local regulations 
still too soft, leaving other faiths in fear of meeting what they feel is 
already a near-impossible condition34. 
Nevertheless, many scholars have speculated on the roots of 
violence and conflicts in Indonesia with different theories, such as 
competition for resources, grievance of injustice, the sudden loss of 
military intervention after the long repression, polarization of different 
religions and ethnicities, frustration during the crisis after Soeharto’s 
fall, and prevalent conflicts during the historical junctures35. 
                                                                
32 Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened : Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia’s New Order, 
30–34; Crouch, “Implementing the Regulation on Places of Worship in Indonesia: 
New Problems, Local Politics and Court Action.,” 405; Seo, State Management of Religion 
in Indonesia, 67. 
33 Ichwan, “Official Ulema and the Politics of Re-Islamization: The Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Ulama, Shariatization and Contested Authority in Post-New Order 
Aceh,” 207. 
34 Crouch, “Implementing the Regulation on Places of Worship in Indonesia: New 
Problems, Local Politics and Court Action.,” 410. 
35 Purdey, “Describing Kekerasan: Some Observations on Writing about Violence in 
Indonesia after the NewOrder”; Yuhki Tajima, “Explaining Ethnic Violence in 
Indonesia: Demilitarizing Domestic Security,” Journal of East Asian Studies 8, no. 3 
(n.d.): 451–72; Gerry Van Klinken, Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: 
Small Town Wars., Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series No. 15 (London: 
Routledge, 2007); Jacques Bertrand, “Ethnic Conflicts in Indonesia: National Models, 
Critical Junctures, and the Timing of Violence,” Journal of East Asian Studies 8, no. 3 
(2008): 425–49. 
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Considering the above studies, the attack on the Bethel church in 
Penayoung is a social violence, or merely vigilantes whose scope was 
limited to local atrocities36. On the other hand, I would like to argue 
that the sharia implementation further catapults the issue of Islamic 
identity among the Acehnese, and the greater local autonomy in the era 
of decentralization of Indonesia further reinforces this Islamic identity 
resurgence.  
The following discussion of the attack on the Bethel church in 
Penauyong is based on the victims’ narratives and the Acehnese 
Muslims’ perception on Christianization. The below interviews are in 
line with the national-level narrative of Christianization and 
discrimination against minorities as explained above and the local 
narrative of the resurgence of Islamic identity formulation in the 
Acehnese Muslims. 
The Victims’ Narratives 
The following narratives were taken from the victims’ perspective: 
a priest of the Bethel Church in Penauyong (Reverend Nico Tarigan) 
and four members of congregation (Mita, Mika, Ipon, and Sianturi) 
who were all attending the sermon during the attack on June 17, 2012.  
Tarigan, the GBI (Bethel Church of Indonesia) priest who led the 
prayers during the attack, whom I interviewed on July 18 2013 after 9 
PM in Madinah hotel of Banda Aceh, comes originally from Medan, 
where he finished his elementary and high school. He went to a 
university and studied Economics, which he, however, did not finish. 
As a priest, he believed that the Christian church should shoulder three 
duties: love and brotherhood (koinoniyah/koinania), taking care of the 
weaks (diakoniyah/diakonia), and bearing witness to faith 
(marturiayah/martyria) (see also Hoon 2013, p. 464), to which his life in 
Aceh has been devoted. In 2005, he moved to Aceh working under the 
YKPMNI (Yayasan Kasih Peduli Masyarakat Indonesia/The Institute of 
Love and Care for Indonesian Society) with the task of distributing 
aids to the Acehnese victims of the tsunami. The aids mainly consisted 
of foods and medicine. He recalled that in 2005 the Yayasan brought 
300 000 kgs rice, not to mention some medicine. 
                                                                
36 Van Klinken, Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars.; 
Tajima, “Explaining Ethnic Violence in Indonesia: Demilitarizing Domestic Security,” 
452. 
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Soon, two Bethel churches were founded in Aceh with 
approximately 70 to 80 members in each church. However, upon the 
incident of the first attack in 2007 the church membership dwindled 
into 60 people. Now the church under the leadership of Tarigan has 
only 40 members, who mostly come from Medan, Menado and Java. 
Less than 10 members are Chinese from Aceh. There is no native 
Christian Achenese attending his congregation.  
Tarigan Bethel’s church was located in Jalan H. T. Daud Syah no. 
47, Penauyong, Banda Aceh. As he did every day, on June 17, 2012, at 
about 10.15 in the morning, Tarigan went out from his store before 
leading prayers in his church. Note that both the store and church used 
the same building; while the store uses the first floor, the church 
operates on the second floor. However, in that morning he suspected 
that three groups of people were rushing to his building. Five people, 
two of whom were on motorcycles, stared at the second floor, where 
the church was located. As Tarigan was anxious, he then closed the 
iron folding gate immediately and climbed to the second floor to start 
the prayers.  
When Tarigan delivered the second speech before his 
congregation, three members of the congregation abruptly shouted 
that a mob had arrived at the gate of the building. Suddenly, it was 
noisy, and the shattering of window glass was heard. Tarigan went 
down through the stairway to see what was happening. He saw Heru, a 
member of the congregation and of the Indonesian air force army 
arguing with one of the attackers, “who accused the church of having 
no government’s license.”  
Part of the building wall was also broken. Seven people intruded 
into the church. The rest stayed outside shouting noisily. Some held 
beams and sticks. While Heru went out to meet them, Tarigan went to 
the second floor to protect the women and children. Those of the mob 
who entered the church destroyed some facilities and belongings: two 
computers, a sound system, an air conditioning, some light bulbs, 
guitars, and a piano keyboard. Being frightened and anxious, Tarigan 
moved all members of the congregation to the third floor.  
The police and the army from the territorial Iskandar Muda Aceh 
then came to the rescue and guarded Tarigan and his congregation’s 
members as they began to exit the building. Passing the crowd, he 
calculated that more than 500 people had joined the mob. Despite the 
advices from the army to Tarigan not to bring anything from the 
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house, Tarigan still managed to save a few documents: some birth 
certificates, a marriage certificate, an appointment letter of priesthood, 
and a government’s license to the church. 
Tarigan was then transported in an armored car. The crowd was 
still furious, hurling vulgar words to the car such as: “Bitch, infidel, 
pollution, and infiltrator to Aceh.” Tarigan was brought to a police 
station in Banda Aceh, where he waited for four hours. The police 
then decided that Tarigan should stand as a witness to the incident. 
However, after about an hour, his status was elevated to a ‘suspect’. 
The priest was accused of triggering the mob, by performing prayers in 
his church (this sounds like the common national scenario befalling the 
Eden group and Yusman Roy mentioned above). 
After a few hours in the police office, Tarigan negotiated with the 
police to allow some members of the congregation, including his wife 
and children, to go home. Before me, Tarigan recalled that “some 
showed depression and therefore vomited.” Around 9 PM, Tarigan 
was also permitted to go home but with the new status of a ‘defendant’ 
who have violated the Aceh’s order.  
A month later, the trial was held. Tarigan was accused of holding 
prayers which triggered a mob attack. The court fined him 1000 rupiah 
(1 cent dollar). He, however, paid 500.000 rupiahs (50 dollar)—the 
only amount Tarigan could afford. However, the attack had left a deep 
impact upon the members of the congregation due to the traumatic 
experiences. For the next few months, the church members were 
always on alert whenever they heard people’s steps. They often woke 
up in the middle of the night, afraid of the sound of passing people. 
Tarigan and his family also suffered the same trauma.  
On July 19, 2013, I went to the church which was attacked by the 
mob. Tarigan introduced me to the members of the congregation: 
Mita, Mika, Ipon and Sianturi, who agreed to share their traumatic 
experiences with me.  
Mita, a girl who still studied at the High School in Aceh, told me 
that during the attack, around forty members of the congregation sung 
prayers with an electric piano keyboard. Suddenly, some people from 
outside intruded in the church and smashed many musical instruments 
with beams and sticks. Her mother tried to stop the intruders, but Mita 
begged her, screaming loudly and telling her not to do so. In fact, 
Mita’s had father passed away earlier. This time, she did not want to 
lose her mother. Indeed, the situation was dangerous: “Chairs, 
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plywood walls, window frames, and other staffs were thrown away. 
Fifteen members of the congregation escaped to the third floor.” 
Ipon, a female member of the congregation originally coming from 
Papua also told me her story. Before the attack at 10.30, “a man 
questioned me on whether the church held the government’s 
permission.” To this, Nipon answered that the church was legal, 
breaking no Indonesian law. “The GBI is one of the Christian 
churches which the government protects.” Nipon then asked the man 
where he came from and for what purpose he posed such a question. 
The man, however, did not answer but left her immediately.  
Mika, another female member of the congregation originally 
coming from Menado, North Sulawesi, also shared her story to me. A 
couple of days before the attack, she attended an arisan (women 
gathering) in the Menado circle in Aceh. She, however, felt that 
“somebody had their eyes on the gathering.” At the end of the 
meeting, the members of gathering, who were mostly Christians, sung 
songs together. A group of men then came to them, asking some 
questions about what activities the gathering did. The host was a 
widow of an army member who lived in the neighborhood for a long 
time. The host then called the head of RT (neighborhood) and kecik 
(village leader) to meet the guests. When the group asked whether “the 
gathering wanted to transform the house into a church, the two village 
leaders convinced the guests that there was neither intention to do so 
nor to build a new church.” But the gathering only practiced choir. 
The two leaders then asked the group to leave and never return to 
bother the neighborhood again.  
Mika also mentioned that a day before the gathering, a couple of 
young men sat in a café nearby and watched the place of gathering 
while waiting for a football game in TV. These men seemed to be “the 
spies or provocateurs, who seemed to be responsible to pinpoint 
suspicious places and spread rumors about a plan to build a new 
church in the neighborhood.”  
According to Mika’s observation about the attack on the Bethel 
Church, no perpetrator was a member of the Peneuyong neighbor-
hood, each of whom Mika knows well. She believed that the 
perpetrators come from outside the area. Before me, she also testified 
that the neighbors watched, or hid during, the incident. The kecik told 
her that they mostly came from Perlak near Lhoksumawe. The kecik 
also heard the rumor that they had planned the attack in a mosque in 
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Banda Aceh far away from Peneuyong. Mika also told me that the 
members of congregation made friendships and built good relations 
with many Mosques around Peneuyong. 
Sianturi, a member of Kodam (territorial army) Iskandar Muda of 
Aceh, who originally comes from Medan, also attended the sermon 
during the incident. When he came to the church, Sianturi, like 
Tarigan, saw a few people sitting on motorcycles in front of the 
building. Keep in mind that Sianturi is a well-trained soldier who has 
developed an “instinct” for security. During the prayers, Sianturi went 
outside the church to check the situation. He then decided to sit down 
in the first floor, whereas Tarigan led the prayers in the second floor. 
Suddenly, some people from outside intruded in the church. He saw 
Ipon was nervous and therefore screaming. Sianturi then checked 
everybody’s safety. No one was injured. He then called the office of 
intelligence and of the Territorial Army. Twenty minutes later some 
polices and armies arrived in, and surrounded, the building. Sianturi 
then helped 15 members of the congregation to escape from the 
building.  
In the aftermath of the attack, Sianturi still received some threats 
through SMS (Short Message System), warning that if the congregation 
still used the same building to perform their prayers, the mob was 
ready to besiege it again. Indeed, in the wake of the incident, the 
congregation decided to move from one place to another. They kept 
their place of worship a secret. But each member was informed before 
Sunday where they would perform prayers. Once, Tarigan told me 
some places which were often used for prayers: Sulthan hotel, Hermes 
hotel, and Wisma Angkatan Udara (Airforce complex) in Jalan 
Pringgondani, which seems to be the safest place—a similar tactic 
employed by some Christian congregations in Java mentioned above 
(see also Crouch 2010). 
The above accounts echo the national narratives of the gloomy 
relations between Muslims and Christians during the New Order and 
the reform period in the following ways. Firstly, the attack on the 
Bethel church in Penayuong recalls the old Muslims’ anxiety of 
building a church. This is clearly expressed in their accusation against 
the church of having no government’s permission. Secondly, from the 
testimonies above, we can conclude that the attack on the church was 
well-panned. Ipon, Mika, and Sianturi testified that certain spies 
monitored the neighbourhood and pointed the suspected and targeted 
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place to be attacked. Thirdly, like in the national level scenario during 
the reform era, in the aftermath of the attack the victims (Tarigan) 
were victimized, whereas the perpetrators (the mob) were set free and 
there is no attempt to bring them to the court trial for justice.  
Nevertheless, the below interviews with Muslims leaders will give 
us a more detailed local narratives behind the attack on the church, 
where the issues of identity, sharia, and Christianization are 
intertwined.  
The Acehnese Muslims’ narratives: Fear of Christianization  
The following narratives provided by Muslim leaders with various 
affiliations—the FPI, MAA (Majelis Adat Aceh/Customary Aceh 
Council), RTA (Rabithat Taliban Aceh/Aceh Student Association), PII 
(Pelajar Islam Indonesia/Indonesian Islamic Students), DDII (Dewan 
Dakwah Islam Indonesia/Indonesian Islamic Call Council), Adidharma 
Senior High School, and WI (Wanita Indonesia/Indonesian 
Women)—support my earlier hypothesis on the sharia implementation 
leading to the novel formulation of Islamic identity among the 
Acehnese Muslims yielding their fear of rumors of Christianization. All 
of these informants are carefully selected to represent Muslims’ voice 
among the elites, whom I mostly met in Banda Aceh. The formulation 
of identity marks the dividing line between we ‘Muslims’ and others 
‘non-Muslims’ in the following ways. Firstly, all of these leaders eagerly 
support the implementation of sharia and at the same time hold fear of 
Christian missionaries, assumed to have operated in Aceh particularly 
in the aftermath of the tsunami disaster. Secondly, they pointed out 
that the Christian missionary was masked in the aid programs given to 
the Acehnese victims. One informant, that is Tarmizi, was likely 
involved in, or at least supported, the Bethel church’s attack, a 
conclusion that can be drawn from his interview below. Thirdly, some 
informants also link the missionary activities to deviant sects, such as 
Millata Abraham. Others, on the other hand, believed that foreign 
countries had intention of obstructing the implementation of sharia in 
Aceh through Christian missionaries. Once again, Islamic identity in 
this vein is marked with a strong dividing line between we Muslims 
and others non-Muslims, including not only the Christians but also the 
Muslim groups which they branded deviant. Fourthly, some 
informants also relate a conspiracy theory by which the two groups 
(Christians and deviant groups) formed an alliance to obstruct the 
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implementation of sharia and to ultimately destroy Muslims in the 
region. 
To begin with, I interviewed Tarmizi,37 one of the board leaders of 
the FPI of Aceh. Tarmizi is a staunch supporter of shariah kaffah in 
Aceh, a term by which he meant as a total implementation of Shariah 
in all aspects of life. At the same time, Tarmizi held this fear that 
Christian and Jewish missionaries harbored a mission to convert 
Acehnese into their religions. To prevent this from happening, Tarmizi 
confessed that he, and his organization, was involved in closing some 
“illegal churches.” To present his words, 
It is the FPI which has unmasked their (Christians) faces. 15 
illegal churches were closed down by force. Usually they 
(Christian missionaries) built stores, but then were used as 
places of worship too, one of which was found in Lamara, 
which then was transformed into a sub-district office (after a 
mass protest). There is CWS (Catholics World Service) 
operating in Aceh, with its international mission. First the 
Service gave aids to Acehnese. But, we consider these aids as 
proofs of their missionary activities. Then, some people (got 
angry) and then burnt (the offices). The mayor of Aceh and 
governor were then involved in mediating (the Acehnese 
and Christians).  
The quotation implies that Christians are not Acehnese but 
outsiders, and not part of the Islamic Acehnese identity formulation. 
As outsiders, the Christians, for Tarmizi, have attacked the Acehnese 
Islamic faith, whereas the Acehnese, as the FPI did, defended 
themselves against the infiltrators. As also mentioned by the victims 
above, Tarmizi accused some churches of being illegal and having no 
government’s license. He further clarified that among 20 churches in 
Banda Aceh, 15 them were considered illegal. Likewise, Singkil has 27 
churches, 7 of which are illegal. In guarding this Islamic identity, 
                                                                
37 Tarmizi finished his Elementary and Secondary schools in Bireuen and then went to 
Islamic Senior High School (Madrasah Aliyah) in Samalang, and finished his BA and 
MA in IAIN (State Institute of Islamic Studies) Ar-Raniry Darussalam at the 
department of Tafsir Hadits (Quranic exegesis and prophet tradition). He is currently 
finishing his Ph.D program at the same Institute. Tarmizi joined the FPI in 2006, 
during which the Front dominated the national media with the news of its mass rallies 
protesting ma’siyat (sinful deeds) found across many cities in Java. According to 
Tarmizi, the Aceh FPI attracts at least 1000 members, mostly university students, but 
only 200 of whom remain active in the Front. 
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Tarmizi stressed that “the FPI is undeterred to besiege the churches,” 
as the government of Aceh showed hesitance to deal with them, and 
never dared to warn these churches.  
According to Tarmizi, like Jewish missionaries, Christian 
missionaries adopted a clandestine tactic (terselubung). They built offices 
for business, which are in fact used as places of worship. The FPI for 
Tarmizi did not commit violence, but adopted a stern attitude. From 
the interview, Tarmizi confessed honestly that the FPI was involved in 
many mobs wanting to close down these places of worship, including 
Tarigan’s church. In Tarmizi’s words, 
(The government of) Indonesia (often) shows a weak and 
soft attitude (towards other faiths), so that many unexpected 
groups and activities have taken place, like in Aceh. The FPI 
decided to go to the ground. We have informants, who, like 
intelligent or spies, investigate (suspected places). We built 
networks in communities. We collected data of the houses 
suspected to become places of worships. We negotiated with 
them and reported to the local authorities. But when 
nothing happened, we went to the field. When the 
government did nothing, we, with the help of community, 
did the (government’s duty). 
Tarmizi’s words confirm what Tarigan, Mika, and Sianturi said 
earlier about certain ‘spies’ looking for suspicious places of worship in 
their neighborhood as objects of the mob attacks. Tarmizi then went 
on that the FPI sought the government’s support, which they got. He 
also told me about the process of mediation between the ‘Acehnese’ 
and ‘Christians.’ Before Walikota (the city mayor), Sekda (Sekretaris 
Daerah/Secretary of the Region), and some Islamist activists, the 
priests of the churches were forced to sign an agreement, not to 
continue the activities of the deemed ‘illegal churches,’ which should 
be shut down afterwards. In a meeting, most of the priests, but Ali 
Gunawan from Medan with the support of a lawyer, signed. Tarmizi 
also testified that the Mayor and the Regional Secretary warned 
Gunawan if he refused to sign, the city would be irresponsible for his 
congregation’s security—a threat to which Gunawan finally 
succumbed.  
Tarmizi then explained that the Jewish and Christian missions 
came to Aceh adopting the same strategy of giving aid to the tsunami 
victims. They declared in the beginning that their aid was on behalf of 
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humanity. But in fact, they spread their faith. Tarmizi saw many books 
containing the stories of Jesus and Virgin Marry distributed among 
kindergartens in Nehen (Aceh Besar), Takengon (Central Aceh), and 
Meulaboh (West Aceh). Tarmizi also claimed that Medan and Surabaya 
priests baptized some Achenese Muslims.  
Tarmizi is critical towards the Indonesian government which does 
not pay attention to the missionary activities, which, for him, broke 
one of the state’s laws, which prohibits any attempt to convert those 
who have embraced a certain religion into another religion. Tarmizi 
also saw that Christian missions were masked with NGOs, such as 
CWS (Christian World Service). In Aceh, some Christians founded a 
reading circle like Yayasan Cinta Baca (the Institute of Love 
Reading),which still can be found in Lamlagang (Banda Aceh), to 
whose board the FPI also once gave warning.  
I also interviewed Sanusi, the head of MAA (Masyarakat Adat 
Aceh/Aceh Custom Society),38 who, like Tarmizi, is also an ardent 
supporter of the implementation of sharia in Aceh. For him, the 
Acehnese adat and sharia has perfectly mingled, so much so that one 
cannot differentiate between the two. For Sanusi, the Acehnese adat is 
simply sharia. Like Tarmizi, Sanusi also fears Christian missionaries. In 
this regard, he also suspected some NGOs’ activists in Aceh, who, 
according to him, only served as vehicles for Christian missionaries. 
Sanusi also commented on the attack on the Bethel church in 
Penaeyung, in which he took part in helping the congregation’s 
members from the mob’s anger. However, the priest Tarigan then 
asked for help from Medan. Sanusi also took another role as a 
mediator between the mob leaders and the congregation. Finally, an 
agreement was signed, leading to the freedom of the priest from the 
court’s accusation.  
In Sanusi’s eyes, the church was illegal. Furthermore, Sanusi also 
suspected a few other Christians opening public prayers. According to 
him, they wanted nothing but to spread their faith to other Muslim 
Acehnese. For this reason, Sanusi regards the mob attack as 
unsurprising.  
                                                                
38 Sanusi gained his BA from the Tarbiyah (Education) Faculty of the IAIN Ar-Raniry. 
Since 1971, he was active in the Golkar Party (Functional Party), the ruling party 
during the New Order period. Not only did he serve as an advisor to the Aceh 
governor Abdullah Puteh, but he was also a close friend to another governor Irwandi 
Yusuf. 
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In explaining the clandestine Christian missionary, Sanusi also 
mentioned that some priests living in Penueyong communicated well 
with the villagers and thus made friendship with them. They founded a 
kindergarten, music band, and restaurant, which were coordinated 
under the umbrella of a Yayasan (Foundation). Sanusi believed that the 
Yayasan has sufficient financial support, through which they also 
educated farmers to plant rice, bought some becak (pedicabs), by which 
they gave some young Acehnese new jobs. They also founded an 
NGO called “Care.” However, due to mass protests, all of these were 
closed down (as Tarmizi mentioned above). Sanusi recalled that one of 
the priests Darmin Sembiring has moved to Yogyakarta. 
According to Sanusi, Christian missionary activities were carried 
out particularly in the wake of the tsunami disaster. Some packaged 
aids were accompanied with books containing Christian teachings, holy 
crosses, and other symbols of Christianity. Once, many Acehneses 
tried to separate the aids and symbols, but they failed. For example, 
Sanusi saw candies wrapped with plastics with the pictures of Christian 
crosses, due to which Sanusi concluded that the clandestine missionary 
were behind the aids. Sanusi also drew another illustration that some 
priests collected young men in a cafe during the times of Islamic 
prayers, preventing them to perform the Islamic duty.  
I went to Abdullah Atibi’s39 house, the vice chairman of the MPU 
(Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama/Ulama Consultative Council) of Aceh, 
which is the most important institution which supports the 
implementation of sharia (Icwan 2011, p. 198). Like Tarmizi and 
Sanusi, Atibi also suspected the Christian missionary of operating in 
the aftermath of tsunami disaster. Atibi also mentioned that holy 
crosses, Bibles, and Christian books were inserted in their aids. He 
likened the missionaries to “memancing di air keruh” (fishing in the 
murky water). Once during a Bappeda meeting (local government), 
Atibi proposed to establish an independent body with the aim to 
investigate all aids from outside Aceh, particularly from foreign 
countries—an idea with which nobody agreed. They all argued that all 
aid poured into Aceh came from people with sincere hearts, to whom 
the Acehnese should be grateful. However, Atibi believed that their 
views were misleading, drawing to the fact that, “some children have 
                                                                
39 Atibi finished his BA from the IAIN Ar-Raniry and Master Degree from Unsyiah 
(Universitas Syiah Kuala) at the Faculty of Education. Atibi has joined the MPU of 
Banda Aceh since 2002. 
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been baptized.” The aid issue mentioned by Tarmizi, Sanusi, and Atibi 
recalls the old remark by a young Muhammadiyah leader Lukman 
Harun during the 1967 parliamentary session who also suggested the 
government to regulate financial support from abroad to churches in 
Indonesia40 (Mujiburrahman 2006, p. 31). 
Nonetheless, Atibi linked the effort of Christiniazation to the case 
of deviant sect, Millata Abaraham, which in 2010 started to promote a 
more inclusive Semitic religion in Aceh, by mixing the teachings of 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. As per its name, the group called 
upon people to return to a more universal teaching of Abrahamic 
roots. A year later, the Aceh local authority arrested the leader, 
Jamaluddin with 125 followers, who was also forced to sign a letter 
stating that he and his followers would repent and return to Islam. In 
this vein, Atibi took part in forcing them to repent under the guidance 
of the head of the Aceh MPU Muslim Ibrahim.  
Interestingly, Atibi also related another evidence of 
Christianization in the national level, that is a Christian Ahok Cahyo 
Purnama was elected as the Jakarta’s vice-governor. Atibi, in this vein, 
also underscores that the popular capital city’s governor Jokowi (Joko 
Widodo) embraces Javanese syncretic Islam, not pure Islam. Moreover, 
he also underscores that in Aceh, some Chinese Christians of 
Penauyong has become members of the local parliament. For Atibi, 
both the central and local government of Aceh adopted too soft an 
attitude towards Christian missionaries. It is clear that Atibi echoed the 
old prejudice and fear of Christian missionaries circulating in the 
Indonesian society since the New Order period now again perceived as 
a threat to the Acehnese Islamic faith.  
At the IAIN Ar-Raniry campus, I also interviewed Hasan,41 one of 
the leaders of DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia/Indonesian Islamic 
Call Council).42 Before me, Hasan said that pihak asing (foreign power) 
                                                                
40 Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened : Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia’s New Order, 
31. 
41 Hasan gained his BA from the Sharia faculty of the IAIN Ar-Raniry, MA from the 
International Islamic University of Malaysia, and is still finishing his Ph.D dissertation 
about politics at the University of Sabah Malaysia. He is also currently a lecturer at the 
Shariah faculty of IAIN Ar-Raniry. 
42 The DDI started to come to Aceh in May 1991. Hasan told me that the DDII has 
more than 1000 members, spreading across 23 districts of Aceh. But only about 18 
branches remain active. 
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are not content with the implementation of sharia in Aceh. He saw two 
efforts to obstruct the sharia implementation, that is Christian 
missionary and deviant sects sent to and developed in Aceh. Like 
Tarmizi, Sanusi, and Atibi, Hasan also told me about some books with 
Christian symbols packed in boxes, sent through the post to Aceh. 
Hasan also mentioned some illegal churches built in Singkil. A 
missionary kindergarten was open in Meulauboh, where an American 
family was expelled due to its missionary effort. A Muslim woman was 
baptized, a news which the Media leaked. She then returned to Islam. 
In Bener Meriah, Central Aceh, two people converted to Christianity. 
In the beginning they were brought to Medan to learn farming. But in 
Brastagi they were baptized. The police caught them in Biruen and 
forced them to return to Islam. For Hasan, some NGOs also harbor 
clandestine missions of apostasy. He concluded that all obstructions of 
the implementation of sharia came from ‘foreign countries.’ To make 
shariah implementation in Aceh is one of their goals. Once again, in 
Hasan’s eyes, the central government did nothing to stop the Christian 
missionaries. 
I also visited Adidharma Senior High School43 in Banda Aceh, 
where I interviewed two teachers, Fahrurizal and Jamaludin. 
Fahrurizal44 who, like other informants above, believed in the Christian 
missionary operating in Aceh especially in the aftermath of tsunami. 
Of the strategies is adopting many Acehnese orphans resulting from 
the natural disaster. Fahrurizal, like Sanusi, also believed that many 
Christian missionaries approached teenagers with a warm attitude in an 
effort to gain sympathy from them, with the goal of eventually 
converting them to Christians. Jamaluddin,45 also believed in the 
Christian missionary operating in Aceh. He pointed out that the 
missionary founded a kindergarten, bringing some Christian books, 
containing the story of Jesus. Jamaluddin, like Hasan, pinpointed to the 
foreign hands in polluting the Islamic faith of the Acehnese. Like, 
                                                                
43 Adidharma high school was founded in 1960 and currently has about 6 classes with 
each having 150 students. 
44 Rahrurizal was educated in Dayah (traditional Islamic boarding school) Zulfan 
Wandi, Raudlatul Qur’an in Tungkup Aceh Besar, finished his BA at the IAIN Ar-
Raniry, taking Tarbiyah Faculty. 
45 Jamaluddin finished Dayah Salafi Darul Huda, Teluk Nibung, Lung Angin, North 
Aceh and finished his BA from the Syariah Faculty, the IAIN Ar-Raniry. 
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Atibi, he also related the Christian mission to the deviant sect Millata 
Abraham.  
I also came to the office of the youth organization RTA (Rabithat 
Taliban Aceh/Student Association of Aceh), where I met Teuku 
Zulkhoiri,46 the head of the research and development section. He, like 
other informants above, also believed in the mission of 
Christianization through aid program in the wake of tsunami. 
Another youth organization which I visited was the PII (Pelajar 
Islam Indonesia/Indonesian Islamic Students), where I met Ahmad 
Yanis,47 the head of Dakwah (Islamic call) and training section. Yanis, 
like Atibi, related the Christian missionary to the deviant sect Millata 
Abraham. He told me that his friend in Unsyiah had converted to the 
sect. He believed that the Millata Abraham was created by America or 
Jewish foundation to disturb Islam in Aceh. He heard that Christian 
missions operated in the border areas of Aceh and Medan. He also 
recalled that in the wake of the tsunami the government of Indonesia 
formed an investigation body which found proof of Christianization 
blanketed under the aid program (as mentioned by Sanusi above). 
Some Christian books for children, Bibles, and healing therapies were 
found. Yanis told me that some Muslims were apostatized.  
I also met Ariwani,48 the head of WI (Wanita Indonesia/-
Indonesian Women), who believed in the Christian missionary 
hypothesis. Ariwani pointed out that young Acehnese who had 
memorized the Qur’an had subsequently converted to Christianity and 
become priests. She said that about 600 Acehnese were trained in Java 
and Medan. She also mentioned Yayasan Sukma, belonging to Surya 
Paloh, intruded by a Christian staff. She reiterated the abovementioned 
                                                                
46 Zulkhoiri finished his Elementary and High schools in the North Aceh and then 
took BA from a private Islamic Institute of Al-Kudwah Depok, West Java. He is 
currently finishing his Master degree at the IAIN Ar-Raniry. 
47 Yanis entered the PII in 2005, when he was still a student at a Senior High School in 
Lokshumawe. Now he is taking an undergraduate program at the Shariah faculty of 
IAIN Ar-Raniry. 
48 Ariwani is a graduate of the Sharia faculty of the IAIN Ar-Raniry, a former member 
of Aceh parliament from the party of PBB (Crescent Star Party), an expert advisor of 
Aceh governor, and currently a candidate of local parliament from the National 
Democratic Party, founded and led by Surya Paloh. Since 1990s Ariwani has joined the 
WI (founded in 1962 in Yogyakarta). From 2000 to the present she has served as the 
head (three times election) of the WI. 
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informants’ opinions suggesting that from Kindergarten to Primary 
School (SMP) Christian books were distributed. 
The above Muslims’ narratives corroborate the narratives provided 
for by the victims presented earlier about the issues of illegal churches 
and the well-planned attack on the church in Penayuong, preceded by 
the role of certain spies monitoring the targeted places. The motivation 
behind this is their fear of Christianization, which belongs to the 
national narrative in the national circulation since the New Order 
period. However, the resurgence of novel Islamic identity formulation 
belongs to the local Acehnese narrative, as it is related to the current 
sharia implementation in the region and especially in the aftermath of 
tsunami. The narratives above clearly relates the fear of 
Christianization to the aid given by outsiders to the Acehnese victims 
of the disaster. Interestingly, some informants above also relate a 
conspiracy theory by which the Christianization missionary and 
‘deviant’ Muslim groups form an alliance to obstruct the 
implementation of sharia. In addition, this identity formulation is 
further strengthened by their suspicion of foreign intervention in 
obstructing the Acehnese’ effort of sharia implementation. 
Dismissing the Rumor 
The following Islamic leaders—affiliated with Unsyiah, 
Baitussalam mosque, FIRLA (Forum Rahmatan Lil Alamin/Blessing 
for Universe Forum), and the Aceh Institute—disagreed with their 
abovementioned counterparts believing in the Christian missionary 
operating in Aceh, a mere rumor and prejudice of Muslims to other 
people with different faith which fail to show any proof. Interestingly, 
they also adopted a critical attitude towards the implementation of 
sharia in Aceh. They also pinpointed the recent sharia euphoria as the 
main cause behind the spreading of rumors of Christianization and 
discrimination against minorities, which led to, for instance, the attack 
on the churches and deviant sects.  
To begin with, in a car repair shop in Banda Aceh, I met Saleh 
Sjafei, a lecturer of Fisip (Faculty of Social and Political Sciences) at the 
Unsyiah.49 To him, the rumor of Christian missionary operating in 
Aceh is no different from similar rumor of Islamization in Indonesia 
(recalling Mujiburrahman’s and Hoon’s thesis mentioned above). It 
                                                                
49 Sjafei finished his BA at the Unsyiah, MA and Ph.D at the Indonesian University 
(UI) of Jakarta in Sociology. 
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should be borne in mind that both Islam and Christianity are religions 
with missionary, whose leaders bear duty to attract more people to 
convert to their faith. As Muslims perform their duty to do dakwah 
(Islamic call), one may also question why Muslims prevents the 
followers of other religions from doing the same duty. Sjafei therefore 
argued that as long as the Christian missionary or Islamic dakwah does 
not violate the law or bother other people, both activities should be 
accepted.50 But he highlights that all of the rumors remain rumors. So 
far, he did not find any strong evidence of apostasy, conversion, or 
illegal churches being built in stores or any other buildings. Sjafei 
underscores that all suspicions to other faiths are mostly based on 
mere prejudices of one group to other groups.  
Sjafei also believed that some people were mobilized and provoked 
to besiege some churches. In fact, they understand neither the purpose 
of their activities nor the real situation. Certain people took advantages 
of their negative sentiments and displayed anger to those of other 
faiths. Sjafii believed that the mass or mob did not realize what they 
were doing. 
The same rings true with the rumor of deviant sects which 
displayed a more political motivation than showing the real issue facing 
the Acehnese. In fact, Sjafii is more concerned about radicalization and 
the conservative movement in Aceh, promoted, for instance, by the 
FPI.  
I also visited the mosque Baitussalam, where I met Muhammad,51 
a regular preacher of the mosque and other mosques in Banda Aceh. 
Baitussalam, founded in 1995, is a place of prayer for 200 people led 
regularly by five imams (preachers), one of whom was Muhammad. 
Muhammad, like Sjafei, believed that Christianization is a mere rumor 
appearing in the wake of the tsunami disaster. For him, there had been 
no problem with Christians living in Aceh before the disaster. He also 
saw that the issue of building of churches has become political issue 
for local and national politicians, who took the benefits from the issue 
for political purposes. In fact, the local and national government 
                                                                
50 In fact, there was also an effort of Christian missionary by South Korean activists, 
which the Indonesian Christians themselves opposed (Seo 2013, pp. 35-36). This 
picture is of course different from the narratives conveyed by some informants who 
fear the clandestine American or European missionary covered with aids given to the 
tsunami victims mentioned above. 
51 Muhammad holds Ph.D from UPM (Putra Malaysia University). 
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played too little a role in suppressing the rumor for the sake of a 
peaceful Aceh. 
I also interview Tengku Muhammad Jafar52 an NGO activist at the 
FIRLA, who participated in monitoring the burning incident of 
Tengku Ayub Dayah, who was accused of promoting deviant teachings 
of Islam. In February 2013, he was also active in monitoring the 
burning of another deviant Dayah belonging to Tengku Mualimin, 
accused of abandoning Friday prayers. To Jafar, the euphoria of the 
sharia implementation in Aceh played a critical role in escalating the 
tension between Muslims and people with other faiths. He observed 
the increase of prejudices and attacks on minority groups in 2007, 
2008, 2010, with its peak of disbanding the Millata Abraham sect (as 
mentioned by Atibi and Yanis above). Indeed, the shariah euphoria has 
a negative impact on minorities. Jafar concluded that the attacks on 
some ‘illegal’ churches cannot be separated from the euphoria of 
sharia.  
I also went to the Baiturrahman grand mosque of Aceh, where I 
interviewed Sukurdi,53 an NGO activist at the Aceh Institute. Sukurdi 
agreed with Jafar’s conclusion that the issue of shariah implementation 
has become an effective tool for the local politicians in Aceh to 
communicate with the people. In fact, shariah is a popular theme 
among the people, which can be used as an effective communication 
tool to attract potential voters. Almost all Aceh politicians showed 
their pro-shariah voices (as Ariwani’s stance shown above). 
Indifference to sharia implementation will cost the politicians’ 
legitimacy54 (see also Ichwan 2011, p. 204). Sukurdi underscored that 
Shariah has become the common language understood by the 
                                                                
52 Jafar went to the Elementary and High schools in Sabang and gaining his BA from 
the Shariah Faculty of the IAIN Arraniry, and still finishing Master at the same 
Institute—agreed with Muhammad on the politicization of Christian missionary 
rumors and deviant sects in Aceh. Jafar was also active in the leftist organization 
SMUS (Solidaritas Mahasiswa ke Rakyat/Students Solidarity to the People) and is still 
currently active in the FIRLA (Forum Islam Rahmatan Lil Alamin/Islamic Forum for 
Blessing the Universe), and JMPSPS (Jaringan Masyarakat Sipil Peduli Syaria/Civil 
Network Care of Sharia). FIRLA was founded in 2011. 
53 Sukurdi, owning a kiosk close to the grand mosque, finished his BA at the Dakwah 
Faculty of the IAIN Ar-Raniry, and MA at the Education faculty of the Unsyiah. 
54 Ichwan, “Official Ulema and the Politics of Re-Islamization: The Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Ulama, Shariatization and Contested Authority in Post-New Order 
Aceh,” 204. 
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politicians and constituents. Due to the sharia ‘fever’ and the trend of 
showing piety in public, prejudices to the people with other faiths has 
also increased. 
For Sukurdi, Christian missionary in the wake of tsunami disaster 
is nothing but a mere rumor circulating in the local political context of 
Aceh. Some (like the informants above) relate the missionary to aids 
given to the Acehnese—a rumor which, for Sukurdi, fails to show any 
proof. To describe the rumors, Sukurdi illustrated an analogy that if 
Muhammadiyah or NU, the two largest Muslim organizations in 
Indonesia, gave aid to victims, these two would put stickers or stamps 
of the organizations in the boxes. This was also the case of Christian 
foundations, which put stickers, symbols, or stamps in their boxes 
containing aid. But the Acehnese people have misunderstood this, 
imagining that the foundations harbor a clandestine Christian 
missionary. Sukurdi also stressed that it is impossible for Christian 
organizations, or also Muslim organizations, to discard their stickers in 
the boxes in the first place before giving the aid to the victims. Sukurdi 
heard that some people tried to discard the symbols belonging to the 
International Red Cross, which look like Christian cross. But the 
symbols are put in almost all boxes containing foods, kitchen utensils, 
and medicines. They, of course, failed to remove these symbols (as 
testified by Sanusi above).  
Sukurdi stressed that a religious symbol is a sensitive issue in Aceh. 
Some cannot see any cross in their homes. Sukurdi also mentioned that 
few Christian organizations taught songs which sounded like gospel 
hymns. Once again, singing like in a choir is part of their tradition, and 
is not necessarily related to religious prayers. One cannot assume that 
they were spreading their faiths. In fact, they helped the victims of 
tsunami to forget the tragedy by singing the songs. Sukurdi also 
remarked that a certain foundation also donated some coloring books 
for kindergarten, with the pictures of castles which look like 
churches—a simple news which became a rumor circulating in Aceh 
suggesting that the foundation taught children to draw churches. In 
fact, they brought the books from their country, perhaps European 
country, with pictures commonly found in their country. In short, 
Sukurdi dismissed all abovementioned prejudices and rumors. 
As far as Sukurdi is concerned, Aceh is a home to different 
churches: HKBP (Huria Kristen Batak Protestan), Catholic, Advent, 
and GBI. Each church is a place for worship for a certain synod, and 
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no member of another synod can use the church of others. In other 
words, one sect has its own church. This case is different from NU 
and Muhammadiayh, whose members can use each other’s mosques 
freely. The Bethel congregation, for instance, had no church, and 
cannot join the others’ church. However, when the Bethel 
congregation found a place of worship, they were accused of building 
an illegal church (victims’ testimonies and Tarmizi’s confessions are 
worth recalling here). This is the problem with regard to the issue of 
illegal church in Aceh.  
Sukurdi also pinpointed the MPU which pronounced some edicts 
of deviant to some groups and related Christian missionary to these 
deviant sects, and missionary to humanitarian aids for tsunami victims 
(as mentioned by Atibi above), as playing a vital role in fueling the 
prejudices among the Acehnese. In fact, the people took the MPU’s 
messages at face values. For Sukurdi, the MPU should pronounce 
better edicts with a better formulation. Rather than denouncing those 
who deviated from Islam, the MUI should approach and educate 
them, through dialogue between Muslims and deviant sects, and 
mosques and churches.  
Like Jafar, Sukurdi also pointed to shariah euphoria which played a 
vital factor leading to anarchism, mass mobilization, and attacks on 
minorities. He took an illustration of an old cinema building close to 
the grand mosque Baiturrahman. After the implementation of sharia, 
the building was demolished. Societal prejudice against those of other 
faiths also increased. Such attitudes has led to screening, and other 
monitoring activities against sharia being on the rise. Before the 
tsunami, a number of music concerts, including rock and dangdut 
(Indonesian music), were often held in Aceh. But after the sharia 
euphoria, there was a rule to divide female and male audiences during 
the concerts. This mentality has extended to many night cafes; after the 
implementation of sharia, no woman dares to go to these cafes, clearly 
reducing the cafes’ customers and thus profits. 
Sukurdi’s collegue at the Aceh Institue, Al Kaf55 recalled that since 
the sharia implementation, as the central government’s compensation 
                                                                
55 Al Kaf obtained his MA from the UIN (State Islamic University)Yogyakarta and has 
been joining the Aceh Institute since 2005, is also an activist of the Yayasan 
Pendidikan Ali Hasyimi (Education Institute of Ali Hasyimi). He described himself 
before me as a caller for prayers in the grand mosque Baiturrahman. His father and 
grandfather were ulama (religious scholars). I met Al Kaf at the Shariah Faculty of 
IAIN Ar-Raniry, a place where he also teaches. 
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to the rebel party GAM56, conservatism has grown in Aceh57. In 2006 
he was involved in a program developed in a Dayah (traditional Islamic 
boarding school) where he showed himself to the Dayah people as a 
liberal young Muslim. Nobody criticized his stance, as Aceh used to be 
“cosmopolitan,” in which Liberal views were tolerated. However, in 
2011, when he wrote a status in Facebook with a liberal tone, he was 
attacked and accused of being deviant. On the one hand, Al Kaf stated 
that shariah indeed tamed the local rebels’ spirit against the central 
government. On the other hand, the real conflict remains and is 
localized in Aceh, leaving the central government free from interfering 
and direct responsibility. Al Kaf, like Sukurdi and Sjafei above, also 
remarked that in the era of shariatization, religiosity and piety have 
become means of local politicians in the public appearances. Issues, 
such as Christian missionary and deviant sects, can be used by 
politicians to show their voices before their constituents. 
In agreement with Sjafie’s view above, Al Kaf also said that like 
Islam, Christianity is a missionary religion, whose leaders want to 
attract more people to their faith. But, the rumor circulating in Aceh 
fails to describe the true reality. The truth is that in the border of Aceh 
and North Sumatera live many Christians.58 However, the rumor 
spreading in Banda Aceh is that they just converted into Christianity. 
In fact, they have embraced Christianity long before sharia 
implementation in the province of Aceh. Misunderstanding played a 
greater role. Al Kaf also heard many people talking about the garden in 
Banda Aceh square which resembles that of Vatican city, a big yard 
with a playground, misunderstood as a symbol of Christianization. 
What is more, a mosque in Meulaboh is suspected of being installed 
with a David star, a Jewish symbol. 
                                                                
56 Ichwan, “Official Ulema and the Politics of Re-Islamization: The Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Ulama, Shariatization and Contested Authority in Post-New Order 
Aceh,” 198. 
57 Feener, Sharia and Social Engineering, the Implementation of Islamic Law in Contemporary 
Aceh., 19. 
58 It is noteworthy that North Sumatera is a home to the largest number of Christian 
population, churches, and schools of Christian education in Indonesia (Seo 2013, pp. 
22-26). German and Dutch missionaries started to enter the region since the Dutch 
colonial era (Aritonang 1994; Kipp 1990; Hasselgren 2000; Mujiburrahman 2010; van 
Klinken 2003, pp. 12-13, 68-80). 
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The above interviews support my argument mentioned above that 
sharia implementation has become an impulse to the new identity 
formulation among the Acehnese Muslims. They emphasize their 
Islamic identity which excludes non-Muslims. This also in fact 
increases discrimination against non-Muslims and Muslims groups who 
are accused of being deviant. The attack on the Bethel church is one of 
the consequences of the resurgence of identity formulation. Most of 
these informants are intellectuals, NGO activists, whose views are 
different from those of politicians earlier who support sharia 
implementation. They are critical towards rumors of shariatization and 
Christianization. The politicians, on the other hand, follow the popular 
narratives of Christianization circulating in the society and perhaps 
even use them to support their political agenda.  
Conclusion 
In looking at the narratives of the attack on the Bethel church in 
Penayuong Aceh coming from both the victims and Muslims’ 
responses to it, the two narratives—national level and local level—
intertwined. The accounts of Christianization—Christian missionary 
blanketed with aids—belong to the national narrative of Muslims’ 
prejudice against Christians in Indonesia. So do the story of attacks on 
minorities, deviant sects, sufi groups, and the destruction of Christians 
churches. The accounts provided for by the informants who support 
sharia implementation and who also hold the fear of Christian 
missionary is nothing new in the Indonesian context. In 1967, the 
parliamentary debates have revealed the dilemmatic relationship 
between religious freedom, Christianization, and Islamization at the 
national level. Nevertheless, some radical and conservative groups—
such as FPI, HTI, and MPU (MUI), commonly found in Java—also 
played a vital role in enforcing conservatism and the growth of 
orthodoxy in Aceh. From the interviews, we see that some also 
questioned the legality of the building used by the Bethel congregation 
in Penayoung, similar voices commonly heard across Java during many 
mob actions. The attack on the Bethel church also reveals a similar end 
of the common story found elsewhere in Java in which the victims 
were criminalized, whereas there is no attempt to bring the 
perpetrators to court for justice.  
Local narratives can be found in the above interviews which relate 
the attack on the Bethel church in Aceh to the role of sharia 
implementation which is part of the Islamic Acehnese identity by 
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which some informants above stressed the difference between we 
‘Muslims’ and others ‘non-Muslims.’ With this, those who were 
considered untrue to Islam, whether they were from deviant sects or 
Christians, had no place in the resurgence of identity formulation. In 
this regard, the implementation of sharia in Aceh which raises the 
revival of Islamic Acehnese identity demands ‘homogeneity’ and 
opposes ‘plurality’ in the society, casting the dark side of sharia for 
minorities. Simply put, non-Muslims are excluded in the novel Islamic 
Acehnese identity formulation in the wake of tsunami disaster. It also 
stands to reason to further conclude that the sharia implementation in 
Aceh yields only a gloomy future for non-Muslims and other 
minorities. 
Nevertheless, formal educational background seems to play the 
least significant role, as almost all informants above went through the 
same Islamic higher education (IAIN) but embraced at least two 
different views with regards to sharia and Christianization: those who 
support the implementation of sharia hold the fear of Christianization 
and those who adopt a critical attitude to sharia dismisses them as 
mere rumors. Apparently, most local politicians and religious leaders 
belong to the first group. On the other hand, besides the Unsyiah and 
Baitussalam mosque, the NGOs, particularly the Aceh Institute or 
FIRLA, play a certain role in nurturing the critical attitude among the 
NGO activists towards sharia implementation. The question, however, 
remains as to the extent that critical thinking can be shared by the rest 
of the Acehnese people.[] 
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